-
Persuasion Meets Delegation,
with Andriy Zapechelnyuk,
Econometrica,
Forthcoming,
October 2024
-
Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport,
with Roberto Corrao and Alexander Wolitzky,
Journal of Political Economy,
Forthcoming,
May 2024
-
The Persuasion Duality,
with Piotr Dworczak,
Theoretical Economics,
19(4),
1701-1755,
November 2024
-
Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching,
with Alexander Wolitzky,
Theoretical Economics,
19(4),
1399-1413,
November 2024
-
Censorship as Optimal Persuasion,
with Tymofiy Mylovanov and Andriy Zapechelnyuk,
Theoretical Economics,
17(2),
561-585,
May 2022
-
Relational Communication,
with Hongyi Li,
Theoretical Economics,
16(4),
1391-1430,
November 2021
-
When to Drop a Bombshell,
with Gabriele Gratton, and Richard Holden,
Review of Economic Studies,
85(4),
2139-2172,
October 2018
[Supplement]
-
Optimal Information Disclosure: A Linear Programming Approach,
Theoretical Economics,
13(2),
607-636,
May 2018
-
Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver,
with Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, and Ming Li,
Econometrica,
85(6),
1949-1964,
November 2017
[Supplement]
-
Euclidean Fairness and Efficiency,
with Gabriele Gratton,
Economic Inquiry,
53(3),
1689-1690,
July 2015
-
Experimental Design to Persuade,
Games and Economic Behavior,
90,
215-226,
March 2015
[Supplement]
-
The Heterogeneity of Concentrated Prescribing Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Antipsychotics,
with Ernst R. Berndt, Robert S. Gibbons, and Anna Levine Taub,
Journal of Health Economics,
40,
26-39,
March 2015
[Supplement]
-
Optimal Limited Authority for Principal,
with Li, Hao and Wei Li,
Journal of Economic Theory,
148(6),
2344-2382,
November 2013
-
Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data,
with Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin,
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
27(2),
301-323,
August 2011